; strickland (2003)研究方法的基础上,控制了机构所有权内生性后,发现大型的公众养老基金能够减少坏的并购,有大型的公众养老基金持股的公司并购后的长期业绩会更好,其他类型机构股东的存在会起到负的作用或没有影响,这与qiu & wan(2008)的研究结论一致。
4. 基于研发支出视角。机构投资者持股对公司的研发决策的影响以及效果,各学者的观点尚未统一。baysinger et al.(1991),hansen & hill (1991),wahal & mcconnell (1997)认为研发支出与机构投资者持股比例正相关。wahal & mcconnell(2000)研究了1988-1994年美国2 500家企业的机构投资者与企业投资性资本支出和研发支出的关系,其结果不支持机构投资者导致公司管理者经营短视之说,反而在行业水平上存在机构投资者的持股比例与投资性资本支出与研发支出存在正相关关系。le et al.(2006)研究发现,无论是实施长期稳健投资战略还是快进快出战略的机构投资者,对研发支出与公司业绩之间的关系都会有直接的影响。研发支出能够对公司的股票价格产生重大的影响,从而保护机构投资者的投资并增加他们的收益(tihanyi et al.,2003),这些研究支持机构投资者积极监督被投资公司的研发决策。
但也有不少学者持不同的观点,berrone et al. (2005)以西班牙公司为样本,考虑了大股东的类型,发现银行机构持股比例与研发投资密度负相关,非企业投资决策中地位更重要,从而使得代理成本更低、代理效率更高、公司业绩更好,等等,这一系列的问题有待我国学者展开进一步探索。
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